Kant opposes pragmatic knowledge of the world to theoretical knowledge of a mere spectator. Whereas the latter, resting on the understanding’s concepts explores the products belonging to the nature, the former is a knowledge of the human being as a citizen of the world. The difference between „theoretical” and „pragmatic” is like the difference between „to know the world” and „to have the world”, to watch the play of nature and to participate in it. This pragmatic orientation was an inherent part of Kant’s philosophical standpoint, even during his work with pure philosophy (he had for thirty years given lectures on anthropology, published in 1798 as *Anthropology from a pragmatic standpoint*).

Dealing with human actions pragmatic knowledge considers „what the human being as a free agent makes, or can and ought to make, of himself”. As a pragmatic anthropologist, Kant tries to know the human being according to what can be made of him. The process of „self-making” - the development of human predispositions and capacities, application of acquired knowledge and skill, acting and interacting with others, coping with affects and passions - needs teleologically oriented sort of knowledge. As the human being is his own final end, anthropology with a pragmatic purpose is not the investigation of nature itself (the final purpose of nature) or of what nature makes of the human being.

In *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant discusses „man’s duty to himself to develop and increase his natural perfection” (for a pragmatic purpose) and „man’s duty to himself to increase his moral perfection” (for a moral purpose only). These duties cannot be taken separately („what is pragmatically ruinous is also morally reprehensible”). To develop both morally and pragmatically is to become a supersensible subject with a transcendental principle ascribed to it and the real person, who would make his way in life.

Kant speaks about pragmatic predisposition to act purposefully and to form regulative principles. The question is whether resting on pragmatic considerations there is a possibility to go beyond subjective intentions of imperatives belonging to lower level of hypothetical imperatives with limited validity and qualified goodness? Whether pragmatic telos can transcend an animal tendency to conform passively to the impulses of comfort and good living (so called happiness). Is there a possibility for a pragmatic doctrine of ends, for a teleology in the domain of *antropon pragmata*, where „pragmatic” doesn’t denote the functional, technical, strategic but, reconciling moral and pragmatic interests, it brings out all conditional melioristic potential, which cannot be realised on principles given *a priori* in pure practical reason. Whether self-effectiveness of constitutive moral maxims and strictly rational justification determines the right of being as human being? Is there primacy of teleological propositions and regulative principles applicable to physics, to biology; and those applicable to the kingdom of ends?

For Kant himself there is an active pragmatic idea of human vocation, of destination of the man to make himself worthy of humanity, actively struggling with the obstacles in continual progress toward the better. This is, according to Kant, the sum total of pragmatic anthropology, in respect to the vocation of the human being. Man’s pragmatic duty to himself regarding his natural potentiality, duty to make natural perfections his end, consists in continual progress (*only* in continual progress and *only* in individual person). This duty, being itself wide and imperfect, must be
confronted with the moral doctrine of ends, based on principles given a priori in pure practical reason.

Were this pragmatic doctrine of ends based on social principles (where the social is not reduced to empirical principles nor founded on reason’s concept of freedom) it could be more realistic than the idea of spontaneous moral order which emerges as the result of the voluntary activities under unconditional law. And surely Kantian deposit in the thought of classical pragmatism would be grater.

Charles Sanders Peirce wrote that his list of categories grew originally out of the study of the table of Kant, „the King of modern thought”. According to Peirce in Kant’s synthetic unity the idea of Thirdness is predominant. Resting on pragmatic considerations, I will compare Kant’s idea of telos as the attained unity with telos of Thirdness, the growth of reasonableness and with conception of developmental teleology of personality as a contribution of creative activity to the evolutionary play of nature.